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 1 Introduction
During recent years, in the European Union, the issue of job security has
become very important. The member states, in fact, are confronted with a
"double bind", that can be summed up as the ﬂexibility-security nexus. On
one hand, there is a demand for increasing ﬂexibility in order to reinforce the
competitiveness of ﬁrms, sectors and countries. On the other hand, workers
demand job security, wage security and employability (Wilthangen, 2003).
This nexus can be addressed by a policy strategy in which both objectives are
represented in a more or less integrated manner. More precisely, ﬂexicurity
can be deﬁned as a policy strategy that attempts to enhance on one hand,
the ﬂexibility of the labor market and, on the other, security notably for
weak groups inside and outside the labor market (Wilthangen, 2003).
In this respect, the European Union in its 2003 Employment Guidelines for
Member States states:
"Member States will facilitate the adaptability of workers and
ﬁrms to change, taking in account of the need for both ﬂexibility
and security [....]. Member States will review and, where appro-
priate, reform overly restrictive elements in employment legisla-
tion that aﬀect labor market dynamics [...]."(Employment Guide-
line for Member States, EU, 2003)
Looser rules about hiring and ﬁring may make easier for employers to hire
workers, thus improving the job prospects of new entrants to the work force
such as young people (i.e. ﬂexibility). At the same time, easing these re-
strictions can also make people, who have already a job, worry more about
the risk of losing it (i.e. security). The question is controversial and the
diﬃculty to ﬁnd eﬀective policy strategies is reﬂected by the history of the
institutional framework of the national labor markets1
From the beginning of the 1980’s in Spain the high rate of unemployment
pushed towards the possible beneﬁts that would derive from increasing ﬂexi-
bility in the labor market. In this view, the ﬁrst reform introduced in Spain,
concerning the liberalization of the temporary contracts in 1984, had as
the main goal an increase in ﬂexibility. In the middle of the nineties, the
high percentage of temporary workers and the high turnover determined a
pressing need for combining ﬂexibility and security. After the poor results
obtained in 1994, a new reform, in 1997, aimed at increasing stability.
This reform, diﬀerently with respect to the majority of the reforms intro-
duced in the Western Europe in the nineties, was not a reform "at the
margin". In fact, instead of introducing further elements of "pure" ﬂexi-
bility (i.e. new kind of temporary contracts), it tried to increase the use of
1See Oecd (2004) for further considerations about the costs and beneﬁts of greater job
security.
2permanent contracts by reducing the costs of ﬁring. Moreover, this reform
can be viewed as a "natural experiment"2. In particular, a "natural experi-
ment" occurs when some exogenous event - like a change in the government
policy - change the environment in which agents operate and the impact of
this change can be evaluated comparing the mean before and after the event
(Besley and Case, 1994)3. The evaluation of the impact of this kind of re-
forms on labor market has stimulated research4 and the nature of "natural
experiment" of the Spanish reform represented an interesting base for several
studies5
This paper evaluates the impact of the 1997 reform in Spain on the per-
ceived job security of the workers. A study of this reform is particularly
compelling because, in contrast with the majority of the European reforms,
it marks a sharp change for some groups (i.e. young workers, older workers,
long-term unemployed, women under-represented in their occupations and
disabled workers), while leaving other groups unaﬀected. This represents an
opportunity to set up a treatment-control design that may provide reliable
estimates (Kugler et al., 2003).
The novelty of the study is the focus on the impact of the reform on the
satisfaction of workers with respect to job security. In fact, the change in
the level of job satisfaction among the workers due to changes in the institu-
tional regime is not frequently evaluated despite its increasing importance.
There is, instead, an increasing attention towards the determinants of the
level of job satisfaction and job security6 and less attention about how these
levels are aﬀected by the macro aspects of the labor market7. In fact, ele-
ments like the rate of unemployment, the Employment Protection Legislation
(EPL) and the Unemployment Beneﬁt (UI), the previous institutional and
economic frameworks aﬀect the perceived job security of the workers and
the behavior of the employees signiﬁcantly; the change on the behavior of
the employees could, indirectly, aﬀect the results of the reform. Moreover,
changes in the level of perceived job security have several potential broad
implications related to investment in job-speciﬁc skills, job mobility, con-
2We consider this reform a natural experiment because it presents the typical char-
acteristics attributed to a natural experiment, i.e. it’s an "exogenous" event that aﬀects
some targeted groups while leaving unaﬀected some other groups.
3This last feature is particularly valuable because, normally, one reason the causal
eﬀect of institutional changes has been diﬃcult to establish is the lack of sharp changes
or reform that can be used for measurement. Most institutional changes in the European
context have been either so gradual or general that it is diﬃcult to identify control groups
that can be used to establish a non-reform baseline necessary for comparison (Kugler et
al., 2003)
4See, for example, Blanchard and Landier (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Bauer et al.
(2004).
5See, for example, Kugler et al. (2003), Dolado et al. (2001), Arellano (2004).
6See, for example, Clark(1997, 1998), Clark et al. (1996,2001), Givord and Maurin
(2003), Manski and Straub (1999).
7See, for example, Clark and Postel-Vinay (2005), Clark et al. (2001).
3sumption and savings, health job-related issues.
In the empirical analysis data drawn from the European Community House-
hold panel (ECHP) for Spain from 1995 to 2000 are used. The ECHP is
a cross sectional longitudinal survey that focuses on household income and
living conditions.
In the evaluation analysis I combine the propensity score matching with a
ﬁxed eﬀect estimator. The latter gives the possibility to exploit the panel
characteristics of our data set while the propensity score matching technique,
applied to the treated and untreated groups in 1995, addresses the problem
of heterogeneity between treated and control groups.
Given the subjective nature of the variable of interest and the risk of some
unobserved heterogeneity, some robustness checks are performed. First of
all, I check if there are some evidence of reform’s eﬀect on other job satis-
faction variables. Secondly, in order to test the robustness of the ﬁxed eﬀect
estimation I perform the analysis on the control groups. To conclude, to
test in a diﬀerent way the robustness of our ﬁndings, we will estimate the
treatment eﬀects using a propensity score matching DID estimator.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 gives a brief description of the
institutional framework of the Spanish labor market and the 1997 reform.
Section 3 presents the data and the empirical model. Section 4 presents
the estimations results. Section 5 presents some robustness checks. Finally,
section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The Institutional Framework
The performance of the Spanish labor market is, among the Oecd coun-
tries, one of the most disappointing, with an unemployment rate, during the
1990’s, exceeding 20%. Accordingly, the employment creation has been one
of the primary challenges facing the Spanish government since 1980 (Martìn,
2002).
The main peculiarity of the actual institutional framework of the Spanish
labor market ﬁnds its origins in 1980, with the approval of the Worker’s
Statute (Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores). This law deﬁned the two
main institutional features of the Spanish system of labor market relations
which, despite several reforms, still remain operative: a high degree of em-
ployment protection (EPL) and the predominance of collective bargaining
at the provincial/industrial level8.
The most signiﬁcant attempt to reduce the strictness of EPL was the liber-
alization of the ﬁxed-term contracts in late 1984. This reform introduced a
whole variety of temporary contracts which, by contrast to the permanent
ones, entailed much lower severance payments, if any, and whose termination
couldn’t be appealed (Dolado et al., 2001).
8See Jimeno and Toharia (1993) for further details.
4Subsequently, in the middle of 90s, two labor market reforms (1994 and 1997)
aimed to reverse the eﬀects of the 1984 liberalization, trying to reduce the
proportion of temporary employment. In the early nineties, in eﬀect, one
third of the Spanish labor force worked under temporary contracts (32:5%)
and more than 90% of all new signed contracts were temporary9. In Spain,
at the moment, there was a pressing need for combining ﬂexibility with se-
curity (Martìn, 2002).
The two main provisions of the reform in 1994 limited the use of temporary
contracts to seasonal jobs and widened the conditions for "fair" dismissal.
The reform had a weak impact on the Spanish labor market. On one side,
the employers continued to hire workers under temporary contracts for all
kinds of jobs. On the other side, the approval of dismissal for "economic
reason" continued to be granted mainly when there was an agreement be-
tween employers and workers, while the labor courts continued to rule most
dismissals as unfair.
At the beginning of 1997, the unemployment rate was 21:5% and there was
a high level of insecure employment. In this context, the employers con-
federation (CEOE) and the major unions (UGT and CC.OO) reached an
agreement to reform the system of employment contracts and the structure
of collective bargaining. This reform aimed to reducing the use of temporary
contracts by increasing the incentives for the ﬁrms to hire workers from cer-
tain population groups using permanent contracts. In practise, the reform
introduced a new permanent contract with lower ﬁring costs in case of unfair
dismissal.
Since 1998, the Spanish government introduced several measures related to
working time ﬂexibility. In particular, with the Agreement on Promoting
Stable Part Time Employment on 13th November 1998, a series of mea-
sures were introduced to promote stable part time employment, permanent
intermittent employment and replacement contracts combined with early re-
tirement.
More recently, the 2001 labor reform suppressed the ceiling for the number
of part time hours and introduced a more ﬂexible distribution of working
hours groups.
2.1 The 1997 reform
Until 1997 all the reforms introduced in Spain, and in the Western European
countries as well, attempted at increasing ﬂexibility through the liberaliza-
tion of temporary contracts. People refers to them as "reforms at the margin"
because of the failure on introducing a fundamental liberalization. Instead,
they may increase the wages of permanent workers (as a consequences of the
creation of a dual labor market), having some undesirable consequences for
9The percentage of temporary contracts in Spain was one of the highest in Europe.
See Martìn (2002) for further details.
5output, employment and segmentation of the labor market10 (Kugler et al.,
2003).
The 1997 reform, conversely, represented the ﬁrst attempt of the Spanish
government to correct the distortions of the labor market, due to the large
increase in temporary contracts of the previous years and, at the same time,
to introduce new elements of ﬂexibility, reducing the dismissal costs for per-
manent contracts.
This reform had three main characteristics. First, it promoted the use of
permanent contracts to hire 18-29 years old, long-term unemployed adults,
disabled persons and temporary workers; secondly, it reduced the use of ﬁx
term contracts; ﬁnally, it promoted combined theoretical and practical edu-
cation among the young to facilitate their entry into the labor market.
Some of the main incentives introduced by the government were: the reduc-
tion of social security contributions11; the reduction of dismissal costs during
a period of two years for new permanent contracts12; the limitation of the
number of ﬁx-term contracts that can be oﬀered; the introduction of new
training policies.
In practise, the 1997 reform reduced the dismissal costs for unfair dismissals
by about 25% and payroll taxes between 40% and 90% for newly signed
permanent contracts and for conversions of temporary into permanent con-
tracts, after the second quarter of 1997, for workers under 30 years of age,
over 45 years of age, long-term unemployed, women under-represented in
their occupations and disabled workers. Severance payments for unfair dis-
missals of newly signed contracts for the workers in the target groups were
reduced from 45 to 33 days pay per year of seniority and the maximum
was reduced form 42 to 24 months. The payroll taxes reduction13 was 40%
for workers under 30 years of age and for long-term unemployed, 60% for
workers above 45 years of age and women under-represented in their occupa-
tions and between 70% and 90% for disabled workers. Furthermore, in some
cases, payroll taxes were reduced again after the second year of employment
(Kugler et al., 2003).
10See, for example, Blanchard and Landier (2002), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002),
Dolado et al. (2001), Hunt (2002), Garcia-Fontes and Hopenhayn (1996), Jimeno and
Toharia (1993,1996), Bertola and Ichino (1995), Bentolila and Dolado (1994); and Bento-
lila and Saint-Paul (1992) for theoretical and empirical analysis of the eﬀect of temporary
contracts.
11Employers are entitled to these reductions when they hire a persons from one of the
target groups and oﬀer them a permanent contract.
12These incentives have the aim to remove the barriers which prevent employers from
oﬀering such contracts.
13In Spain, the average payroll tax rate was about 33% of the salary of the worker. The
uniform payroll tax rate was diﬀerentiated by age group and contract. For example, for
young workers it was the 28:3% of the salary. The reduction of 40% implied a new payroll
tax rate of about 16%.
63 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
Data are from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) from
1995 to 200014. The ECHP is a cross-sectional longitudinal survey focusing
on household income and living conditions: information on health, education,
housing, migration, demographics, employment characteristics and satisfac-
tion are provided15.
A panel has been extracted from the ECHP for Spain including men and
women between 16 and 65 years of age, employed16. The panel presents
attrition, as typical in a household panel, due to non response and changes
in the life of respondents (death, moving, etc.). In Peracchi (2002) the esti-
mated average attrition for Spain is 10%.
The question on job security is inserted in a wide range of questions regard-
ing personal satisfaction of the ECHP questionnaire. The exact wording is
as follow:
Question: "How satisﬁed are you with your present job or busi-
ness in terms of job security? Using a scale form 1 to 6, please
indicate your degree of satisfaction. Position 1 means that you
are not satisﬁed at all, and 6 that you are fully satisﬁed"
The typical formulation of this kind of questions contains a subjective ele-
ment regarding the meaning of "satisﬁed" or even "job security" that could
vary from one person to another (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2005)17
The expected impact of this reform might be ambiguous. First, the re-
duction of ﬁring costs may increase the probability to access to permanent
contracts18, aﬀecting positively the level of job security. Secondly, the lay-
oﬀ procedure became "easier" and this could make the "new permanent"
workers (e.g. individuals hired with permanent contracts after 1997) feel
less secure.
To conclude, Table 2 and Table 319 describe the composition of the sam-
ple and of the treatment and the control groups considered in our analysis,
14We exclude the ﬁrst (1994) and the last wave (2001): the ﬁrst one because there
are no workers hired with permanent contracts; the last one because, in the same year,
another reform that modiﬁes and extends the 1997 refomr, has been introduced. This
reform modiﬁes and extends the one occurred in 1997.
15See Peracchi (2002) for further details.
16The questions related to job satisfaction are asked only to employees. See Tab. 1 in
the Appendix B for composition of the sample.
17This implies that it could be not compared across individuals or countries in a obvious
way. Considering the kind of estimation analysis we are going to exploit this element has
to be taken in account.
18See Kugler et al. (2003).
19See Appendix B.
7respectively. The treatment and the control groups diﬀer for some character-
istics, as sex, marital status, number of children, level of education, kind of
contract (permanent and temporary), sector (public or private), experienced
past unemployment: the so-called observable pre-treatment characteristics
that require a proper control.
3.2 The identiﬁcation strategy
The aim of this paper is to investigate the eﬀect of the reduction on dismissal
costs on the level of perceived job security.
The variable on interest is the perceived job security of the worker that,
as all the satisfaction variables, is a categorical variable (it takes the value
1-6: not satisﬁed-fully satisﬁed), with an underlying ordinal utility, that is
transformed into cardinal linearizing the outcome variable: any translation
into numbers is suitable,provided that the order of the "values" is preserved
(Van Praag et al., 2003). Each observation of the ordinal output variable is
set equal to the expected mean of a truncated normal distribution20.
Two diﬀerent treatment groups are identiﬁed: the ﬁrst group is composed
by individuals under 30 years of age and the second by individuals above 45
years of age21. In each of the two treatment groups the individual are tem-
porary workers and they are entitled, after the reform, to be hired with the
new permanent contracts (i.e. permanent contracts with lower ﬁring costs).
Four control groups are constructed. The ﬁrst is composed by individuals
with less than 30 years of age, working with a "traditional" permanent con-
tract; the second by temporary workers with an age between 30 and 36 years;
the third by permanent workers with more than 45 years of age; ﬁnally, the
fourth by temporary workers with an age between 38 and 44 years.
The ﬁrst treatment group (i.e. temporary workers with less than 30 years
of age) is compared, ﬁrst, with permanent workers with less than 30 years
of age and, secondarily, with temporary workers with an age between 30
and 36 years. In the same way, the second treatment group (i.e. temporary
workers with more than 45 years of age) is compared with the control group
composed by permanent worker with more than 45 years of age and with the
group of temporary workers with age between 38 and 44 years (Table 1).
20See Appendix A for further details.
21We don’t consider the long-term unemployed because we cannot observe them. We
exclude also the women under-represented in their work place because they may be self-
selected (Kugler et al., 2003). We exclude also the disabled workers because of a lack of
observations.
8Tab. 1: Treatment and control groups comparisons.
Treatment groups Control groups
Below 30 with temporary contracts Below 30 with permanent contracts
Below 30 with temporary contracts Age 30-36 with temporary contracts
Above 45 with temporary contracts Above 45 with permanent contracts
Above 45 with temporary contracts Age 38-44 with temporary contracts
To each treatment group two control groups are assigned. In the ﬁrst case
treated and untreated have the same age, but diﬀerent contracts (temporary
and permanent respectively); in the second case, treated and untreated have
the same temporary contract but diﬀerent age22.
Figures 1 and 2, show that the treatment group composed by temporary
workers with less than 30 years of age presents a change in the level of
perceived job security starting in 1997. After the reform, this group presents
an increasing level of job security. The ﬁrst control group (i.e. permanent
workers with less than 30 years of age), instead, presents a more stable
pattern along all the period. The second control group, ﬁnally, has a less
stable pattern in the period of analysis, without showing a precise trend.
Considering the second treatment group (see ﬁgure 3 and 4) there is no
evidence of same eﬀect on the level of perceived job security induced by the
reform. In fact, in the observed period, the perceived job security of the
target group doesn’t change, as well as the level of job security of the ﬁrst
control group (i.e. permanent workers with more than 45 years of age). As
before, the pattern of the second control group is less stable than that of the
ﬁrst control, but there is no evidence of a trend change.
22The ﬁrst control group is composed by individuals who are in a better situation than
the treated; the second control group is composed by individuals who are in a worse
situation than the treated.
9Fig. 1: Average level of job security for the "below 30" treatment group versus the "below 30"
control group (yearly means)
Note: ECHP dataset.
Fig. 2: Average level of job security for the "below 30" treatment group versus the "age 30-36"
control group (yearly means)
Note: ECHP dataset.
10Fig. 3: Average level of job security for the "Above 45" treatment group versus the "Above 45"
control group (yearly means)
Note: ECHP dataset.
Fig. 4: Average level of job security for the "Above 45" treatment group versus the "age 38-44"
control group (yearly means)
Note: ECHP dataset.
11The presence of observable diﬀerences between the treatment and the control
groups requires the use of a set of control variables: demographic variables23,
variables related to the job conditions and income24.
3.3 Estimation strategy
3.3.1 The traditional Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences estimator
In a natural experiment, the most used estimation strategy is based on the
Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences (DID) estimator. The DID allows a comparison
between a pre-treatment and a post-treatment outcome for those individuals
exposed to the treatment, using an untreated comparison group (the so-called
control group) to control for temporal variations of the outcome that are not
due to the treatment exposure (Abadie, 2005).
The basic DID framework can be described as follow. Let Y (i;t) be the
outcome of interest for individual i at time t. The population is observed in a
pre-treatment and a post-treatment period. Let’s denote t = 0 in the former
case and t = 1 in the latter case. Between these two periods a fraction of the
population is exposed to the treatment. Similarly, let’s denote D(i;t) = 1 if
individual i is exposed to the treatment and D(i;t) = 0 otherwise (Abadie,
2005).
The conventional DID estimator is often speciﬁed using a linear parametric
model:
Y (i;t) = °0 + °1t + °2D(i;t) + °3t ¢ D(i;t) + "(i;t) (1)
^ °3 is the Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences estimator:
^ °3 = (°D=1;t=1 ¡ °D=1;t=0) ¡ (°D=0;t=1 ¡ °D=0;t=0) (2)
that measures the eﬀect of the treatment.
The DID estimator is based on a crucial and critical assumption. The error
term has to be uncorrelated with the other variables (e.g. cov("i;Di;ti) = 0).
This means that the average outcomes of the treated and the untreated, in
absence of treatment, would have followed parallel paths over time (Abadie,
2005).
This is implausible if the pre-treatment characteristics, associated with the
dynamics of the outcome variable, are unbalanced between treated and con-
trol groups. As a consequences the estimator will be biased (Abadie, 2005).
23Sex, age, age squared, level of education (high, medium and low), marital status,
immigrant status, number of children.
24Professional level (manager or professional, intermediate, blue-collar), sector (private
or public), economic sector, working hours (full time or part time), size of the ﬁrm, expe-
rience in the labor market, experience of past unemployment, length of the unemployment
spell, income of the household.
12As shown by Heckmann et al. (1998), this bias can be split in three parts:
a ﬁrst component due to the non overlapping support (i.e. the populations
have completely diﬀerent characteristics, X), a second due to the diﬀerent
distributions of X, within the two populations, a third due to the diﬀerences
in outcomes that remain even after controlling for the ﬁrst two biases25.
The diﬀerences in observed characteristics, in fact, might create non parallel
dynamics in the perceived job security for the treated the untreated. The
bias due to diﬀerences in the characteristics and their distribution within
group might become relevant and the evaluation problem could not be ad-
dressed with the traditional DID.
Looking at ﬁgures 1 to 4, I could notice that in the pre-reform period the
treatment and the control groups don’t seem to follow parallel paths in all
the comparison considered. These empirical evidence, then, support the fact
the basic assumption of the DID estimator is not valid.
3.3.2 The propensity score matching and the ﬁxed eﬀect estima-
tor
Two main aspects have to be considered to set up the evaluation strategy
in a proper way. The ﬁrst relates to the heterogeneity between and within
treatment and control groups. The second refers to the panel characteristics
of our sample.
Given these considerations, the empirical strategy used is composed by three
step. First, the panel has been balanced in order to have the same individu-
als in all the years considered. In this way, I address the problem related to
the heterogeneity over time, due to the possibility that in diﬀerent years the
treatment and the control groups could be composed by diﬀerent individual.
Secondly, to control for heterogeneity between groups, the treatment and the
control groups are matched on the basis of a set of pre-treatment observable
characteristics, using a propensity score matching method.
The propensity score is deﬁned by Rosembaum and Rubin (1983) as the con-
ditional probability of receiving a treatment given the pre-treatment charac-
teristics:
P(X) ´ PrfD = 1jXg = EfDjXg (3)
where D = f0;1g is the indicator of exposure to treatment and X is the
multidimensional vector of pre-treatment characteristics.
Several methods are available in order to match treatment and control groups
25The latter is the selection bias and it is due to the selection of the unobservables. This
kind of bias can become less relevant if, as in our case, the data are administrated with
the same questionnaire and the treated and the untreated reside in the same local labor
market (Heckmann et al., 1997).
13on the basis of the propensity score26. I use the Kernel Matching method that
matches all the treated with a weighted average of all controls, with weights
that are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity score
of the treated and the controls (Becker and Ichino, 2002). In particular, the













where G(:) is the kernel function and an is a bandwidth parameter.
Formally, two hypothesis are needed in the matching process in order to de-
rive, successively, the treatment eﬀect. The balancing property of treatment
variables27, as well as, the unconfoundeness given the propensity score must
hold28 (Becker and Ichino, 2002).
The use of the propensity score addresses properly the issue of common sup-
port and miss-weighting29. In fact, the balancing property of the propensity
score implies that observations with the same propensity score must have the
same distribution of observable characteristics independently of the treat-
ment status (Becker and Ichino, 2002). Furthermore, the matching method
links to each treatment a control unit having the closest propensity score.
Eventually, the treatment eﬀect of the reform on the perceived job security
of the worker, using a ﬁxed eﬀect estimator on the matched and balanced
sample is estimated.
In practice, we estimate the following equation:
Yi = ®i + ±t + °Di;t + ¯Di;tPost1997 (5)
where ®i indicates the individual eﬀect, ±i indicates the time eﬀect, Di;t
is a dummy variable that assume value 1 when the individual is treated
and 0 otherwise, Post1997 is a dummy variable that assumes value 1 if we
observe the post reform period and 0 otherwise. ¯ is the parameter of in-
terest that measures the eﬀect of the reform. The key assumption of this
approach is that the unobservables ®i (i.e. individual eﬀects) are time in-
variant (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
The ﬁxed eﬀect model has the attraction of allowing one to use panel data to
establish causation under weaker assumption than those needed to establish
causation with cross-section data or with panel data models without ﬁxed
26The most common methods are: Nearest Neighbor Method, Radius Matching, Kernel
Matching and Stratiﬁcation Matching.
27If P(X) is the propensity score, then D ? Xjp(X).
28Suppose the assignment to the treatment is unconfounded, i.e. Y1;Y0 ? DjX (CIA -
unconditional independence assumption). Then, assignment to treatment is unconfounded
given the propensity score, i.e. Y1;Y0 ? Djp(X).
29See Heckman et al. (1997).
14eﬀects, such as pooled models and random eﬀects models (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005).
4 Results
The aim of the reform introduced in Spain in 1997 was to reduce the instabil-
ity in the labor market through a new restrictive permanent contract. The
expected eﬀect on the level of perceived job security might be ambiguous. On
one hand, an increase in the level of job security for the target groups, due to
an increasing probability to access to permanent contract, is expected. On
the other hand, the reduction of ﬁring costs, that accompany this contract,
can introduce a higher level of insecurity among the workers. In practise, the
ﬁnal eﬀect of the introduction of these new restrictive permanent contracts
depends on the concern of the workers with respect to the higher probability
to be hired and the higher probability to be ﬁred.
To analyze the impact of this reform we use a ﬁxed eﬀect estimator after
having matched treatment and control groups on the basis of the propensity
score technique.
The aim of combining these two techniques is to solve the problem of het-
erogeneity of the treatment and the control groups and to use the panel
characteristics of our sample as well. In fact, the variable of interest is a
measure of the subjective perception of the workers about the possibility
to lose their job and, several worker’s characteristics as age, gender, kind
of contract, past experiences of unemployment could aﬀect signiﬁcantly the
perceived job security (see, for example, Clark (1997, 1998), Clark et al.
(1996,2001,2005)).
For this reason, we ﬁrst balance the panel, then we obtain the propensity
score30 and we identify, for each participant, all non participants who match
on the propensity score31, using kernel weights. Finally, on these matched
samples we estimate the treatment eﬀects of the reform using a ﬁxed eﬀect
estimator. A separate analysis for blue-collar workers has also been per-
formed.
Tab. 4 reports the estimation results.
The reform has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect for the temporary workers
with less than 30 years of age, in both the comparisons performed. This re-
sults is coherent with the literature on the relationship between job security
and strictness of EPL. In Clark and Postel-Vinay (2005), for example, the
authors, using data from ECHP for 12 European countries, found a negative
relationship between job security and job protection, i.e. workers feel less
30To estimate the propensity score (See Becker and Ichino (2002)) we use a set of
demographic variables and some related to the job conditions of the individuals. See
footnotes 22 and 23.
31See Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
15secure in countries where the jobs are more protected. Also in Spain, the
reduction of strictness of EPL seems to have introduced a higher sense of
security. On the other hand, our results are coherent also with the conclu-
sions of Kugler et al. (2003), who investigate the impact of the reform on the
probability of transition between diﬀerent states. They noticed an increasing
probability, in particular for young individuals, to move from temporary to
permanent employment.
There is no eﬀect instead on the perceived job security for the workers more
than 45 years old. This is explained by the fact that for this group together
with an higher probability to move from temporary to permanent perma-
nent positions, there is an higher probability of transition from permanent
employment to non employment as well32.
These results are conﬁrmed also by the analysis performed only on the blue-
collar workers. The temporary workers with less than 30 years of age show
an increase in the perceived job security due to the introduction of the reform
in both comparisons. Table 5 shows the estimation results.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
5.1 The outcome variable
The outcome variable of our analysis - the perceived job security of the
workers - is subjective and this might rise some doubts about the estimation
results. In other words, it might be that the eﬀect captured by our estimator
is aﬀected by subjective bias even after controlling for individual character-
istics.
One way to check for the existence of a possible subjective bias is to explore
the overall satisfaction with respect to job and other dimensions related or
unrelated to the changes introduced by the 1997 reform.
The ECHP questionnaire contains a set of satisfaction questions related to
diﬀerent aspects of the job conditions. I plot the yearly average level of
diﬀerent satisfaction variables for the ﬁrst treatment group - i.e. temporary
workers with less than 30 years of age - and the ﬁrst control group, com-
posed by permanent workers with less than 30 years of age33. In ﬁgure 5, the
overall job satisfaction variable that comes out from the following question:
How much satisﬁed are you with your work or main activity?
The answers are ranked from 1 to 6, where 1 means not satisﬁed and 6 fully
satisﬁed.
32See Kugler et al. (2003).
33In the paper, we propose this check only for the ﬁrst treatment-ﬁrst control groups
comparison and only for some satisfaction variable for simplicity reasons. For more de-
tailed information, please ask to the author.
16Fig. 5: Average level of job satisfaction for the "below 30" treatment group versus the "below 30"
control group (yearly means)
Note: ECHP dataset.
The overall job satisfaction of the treated is increased starting from 1996 and
there is not a speciﬁc change after the 1997 reform. The control group, on the
other side, shows a similar increasing pattern on the level of job satisfaction,
since the year of the reform. Moreover, the diﬀerences in the level of job
satisfaction among the two groups is not so wide as in case of the perceived
job security.
The satisfaction related to the distance from the workplace is interesting
because it’s totally unrelated to the reform. The question is:
How satisﬁed are you with your present job in terms of distance
to job/commuting?
Figure 6 makes clear that there are no changes in the level of the satisfaction
after the 1997 reform both for treatment and control groups and, moreover,
they both follow the same pattern.
17Fig. 6: Average level of distance satisfaction for the "below 30" treatment group versus the "below
30" control group (yearly means)
Fig. 7: Average level of working time satisfaction for the "below 30" treatment group versus the
"below 30" control group (yearly means)
Note: ECHP dataset.
18Figure 7 and 8, represent the yearly average level of satisfaction related to
working time and working/environment conditions respectively. The two
question are:
How satisﬁed are you with your present job in terms of working
times (day time, night time, shifts, etc.)?
How satisﬁed are you with your present job in terms of working
conditions/environment?
Also in these cases, there are no clear changes in variables trajectories after
the 1997 reform and the two groups follow the same pattern and have almost
the same level in respect to both working times and working conditions sat-
isfaction.
Fig. 8: Average level of environment satisfaction for the "below 30" treatment group versus the
"below 30" control group (yearly means)
Note: ECHP dataset.
At the end, the reform’s impact estimated on the perceived job security of
the workers seems to capture the real eﬀect and not a subjective bias, given
that the other job satisfaction variables are not aﬀected by the reform.
195.2 The ﬁxed eﬀect analysis of the control groups
The application of the ﬁxed eﬀect estimation technique to the control groups
allows to test the correctness of the group construction and the possible
heterogeneity between treated and untreated. In case of correct set up
of our analysis, the coeﬃcient ° - i.e. the coeﬃcient related to the treat-
ment/control dummy - should be 0 and there should not be any treatment
eﬀect, i.e. ¯ not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
More speciﬁcally, I estimate the equation (5) twice. In the ﬁrst case, D
should be equal to 1 if individuals are permanent workers with less than 30
years of age (i.e. ﬁrst control group related to ﬁrst treatment group) and
0 if individuals are permanent workers with more than 45 years of age (i.e.
ﬁrst control group related to second treatment group). In the second case, D
should be equal to 1 if individuals are temporary workers with age between
30 and 36 (i.e. second control group related to ﬁrst treatment) and 0 if indi-
viduals are temporary workers with age between 38 and 44 years (i.e. second
control group related to second treatment). In both cases, the coeﬃcients °
and ¯ are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 034.
5.3 The propensity score matching DID
The robustness of the results obtained with the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator is
checked by performing the same analysis using a propensity score matching
DID estimator. First, we balance the panel in order to have the same indi-
viduals each year. Secondly, in each year we match treatment and control
groups on the basis of the propensity score35, using kernel matching tech-
nique. Finally, we evaluate the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences for couples of year
(i.e one year after the reform versus one year after the reform). This proce-
dure will be done for each treatment-control comparison. The structure of
the analysis is as follows:
Tab. 1bis: Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences structures.
DID Structure
DID98¡95 ATT1998 ¡ ATT1995
DID99¡95 ATT1999 ¡ ATT1995
DID00¡95 ATT2000 ¡ ATT1995
DID98¡96 ATT1998 ¡ ATT1996
DID99¡96 ATT1999 ¡ ATT1996
DID00¡96 ATT2000 ¡ ATT1996
Table 6 shows the estimation results. The treatment eﬀects estimated with
the propensity score matching DID conﬁrm the results obtained with the
34For detailed results, please contact the author.
35For the variables used in the deﬁnition of the propensity score see footnotes 22 and
23.
20ﬁxed eﬀect analysis. There is a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect for the tem-
porary workers with less than 30 years of age in both the comparisons with
the two control groups in almost all the cases. There are no eﬀects for the
temporary workers with more than 45 years of age.
6 Conclusion
This paper uses the labor market reform, that occurred in Spain in 1997,
introducing new restrictive permanent contracts characterized by lower dis-
missal costs and lower payroll taxes. The 1997 reform represents a "natural
experiment" and allow us to set up a research design to evaluate its impact
on the perceived job security of some target groups of Spanish workers.
The introduction of these new restrictive permanent contracts could produces
a double eﬀects. One side the probability to be hired with a permanent con-
tract is higher - and this rises the sense of security of the workers - on the
other it becomes easier to be ﬁred and this, of course, makes the worker
feel insecure. Estimates using ECHP data for Spain suggest that the reform
increased the perceived job security for workers with less than 30 years of
age and there were no eﬀect for workers with more than 45 years of age.
The results are robust even using the blue-collar workers’ sample and the
propensity score matching DID technique.
In previous studies36 the relationship between job security and strictness of
EPL is found to be negative. This means that high level of Employment
Protection is associated with low level of security and viceversa.
Our analysis, then, conﬁrms that in Spain, the introduction of looser EPL
did increase the job security and changed the distribution of the perceived
job security from less to more satisﬁed position in the satisfaction ranking.
36See, for example, Clark and Postel-Vinay (2005).
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24A Truncated normal distribution
Let us suppose that the random variable X is N(0;1), and we consider the






ordinate atX = c1
right hand tail area
= M1 (6)












In the analysis, X is the ordered variable describing the level of job security, c1
and c2 are respectively the level 1 and 6 of the satisfaction ranking. Following
the previous procedure and a new continuous variable (i.e. security_pols) is
created, simply setting security_polsi = E(security_satj¹i¡1 < security_sat ·
¹1).
37See Maddala (1986) for further details.
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